assert the wholeness, but insists—rightly, as I think- that we must seek a dynamic theory to explain it. His theory postulates a non-spatial complex entity, described as an intensive manifold, and named by him *entelechy,* which acts into space to modify the physico-chemical processes of living bodies. He maintains that entelechies and material things are so unlike in nature that they must be regarded as ultimately different forms of reality. And this is perhaps the weakest point of his argument. I have myself inclined in my long discussion *(Body and Mind)* towards the dualistic conclusion; but I cannot yet see that the evidence is final. What is final and incontestable is, to my mind, the teleological nature of psychical activity and its causal efficacy in the life of organisms.

Driesch himself seems to postulate in the higher organisms something like a hierarchy of entelechies of which the supreme member is the self-conscious Ego. He speaks of the latter as the objectal-psychoid, and writes that it plays upon the brain as upon a piano. It is an elementary autonomous natural factor which we are driven by the facts to postulate.

A few citations from one of the later of his many expositions *(Problem of Individuality,* 1914) will aid the reader to some grasp of his line of reasoning and his conclusions. It is proved in certain cases that ' *every* cell of the original system [an embryo] can play *every* single tole in morphogenesis; *which* role it will play is merely a " function of its position ". In face of *these*

facts, the machine theory as an embryological theory becomes an absurdity. These facts contradict the *concept* of a machine. . . . Now, the machine theory was the *only* possible form of a mechanistic theory that might